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Current defense planning methods do not ensure a direct connection between 
national security objectives and military tasks. The Strategy-to-Task method provides a 
framework for solving this deficiency by establishing a hierarchy, starting from national 
objectives, through military objectives and missions to military tasks. Below these tasks, 
performance standards can be used for estimating the utility of a given task. This 
hierarchical approach helps decision-makers understand these important linkages. It 
could also serve as a framework for prioritizing the different tasks and contribute to better 
resource allocation, by analyzing different alternatives in a multi-attribute space. There 
are two decision-supporting methods for setting up priorities within this hierarchy of 
multi-attribute objectives. The first one, Multi-Attribute Utility Function Analysis, is a 
useful method for cases when performance standards can easily be established. This 
method could be used under both certainty and uncertainty and can address dependence 
and independence among the attributes or their utilities. The second method, the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process, could be used in cases when performance standards are 
difficult to establish as is typically the case in the higher levels of the hierarchy. The 
hierarchical approach and the two methods are illustrated through the case of Hungary's 
participation in NATO peace-operations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defense is still a substantial task of governments. There is a significant gap 
between the resources required by the military for the implementation of its politically 
determined tasks and the resources provided by elected politicians through the 'power of 
the purse'. As far as this gap is concerned, defense resource planning plays an important 
part in defense planning, because it tries to match the required and the available resources 
and to ensure efficient and effective resource allocation. 
Resources are not en~s in themselves, but they must be provided because defense 
forces are to accomplish special tasks. Defense Resource Planning should be a simple, 
transparent and logical procedure. It should reflect the given national interest, national 
security objectives, national strategy, and the available human, financial and 
infrastructure resources. Therefore, it should organize different alternatives in such a way 
that optimal decisions can be made and those decisions can be proved by decision-makers 
before political leaders. · Strategy-to-Task Resour~e Management (STRM) provides a 
framework for systematically addressing resource issues by stating what politicians 
expect the military to do with the assigned forces and how the military plans to meet 
those expectations. 
By establishing hierarchies, to create a linkage from national objectives down to 
tasks, decision-makers can keep competing objectives in view and take into account 
1 
every aspect of their resource allocation decisions. Setting up priorities gives decision-
makers a tool to create better understanding of dependent objectives. 
Current application of Multiattribute utility function analysis (MAUF A) and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) for planning, resource allocation and group decision 
making suggests its potential use for defense resource planning. Decision-making in a 
complex situation, such as defense resource planning and allocation, is difficult, because 
attributes on the same level of the hierarchy can depend on each other as well as on the 
attribute in the next higher level. In this case, the application of the Multiattribute Utility 
Functions might be more adequate. By applying the best priority setting method, 
decisions concerning defense resources could ensure more effective and more efficient 
resource allocation in the era of scarce national resources. 
Peace operations became important tasks for the military after World War II. 
Certain objectives must be met during a peacekeeping mission. These objectives depend 
on the particular situation but may include implementing the special peacekeeping task, 
defending convoys providing humanitarian assistance, and defending members of the 
peacekeeping mission should they be attacked. 
Hungary's active participation in peace operations was an important consideration in the 
evaluation of its armed forces when Hungary was invited to join NATO. Considering the 
increasing importance of peace operation activities in NATO's future, the thesis will 
2 
analyze STRM through these activities and the capability of Hungary to take part in these 
operations. 
A. PURPOSE 
There are several purposes of this thesis. One of the purposes is to show what 
Strategy-to-Task Resource Management is and what the advantages and disadvantages 
are of using STRM. The second purpose is to demonstrate the possibilities of applying 
hierarchies in defense resource planning. Another aim of this thesis is to explain the 
advantages of using Multi.attribute Utility Functions and AHP for defense planning. The 
fourth objective of this study is to show how a hierarchy could be configured for defense 
planning and how priorities could be set in defense planning with using the AHP and 
Multi.attribute Utility Function approach. An addi.tional purpose of this thesis is to 
explain how using hierarchy-based Strategy-to-Task defense planning could ensure the 
civilian control. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis tries to find answers to the following questions. 
1. What is Strategy-to-Task Resource Management method (STRM)? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of STRM? 
2. What are the possibilities for applying hierarchies in defense resource planning? 
3 
3. What are the advantages of using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Multiattribute 
Utility Functions for defense planning? 
4. How can a hierarchy be configured for defense planning? 
5. How can priorities be set in defense planning with using the AHP and Multiattribute 
Utility Function approach? 
6. How can the civilian control be ensured by using hierarchy-based Strategy-to-Task 
defense planning? 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis will start with an overview of defense planning. It will study the 
objectives of defense planning, the different planning approaches and describe the 
various participants of this process. The first part will conclude with a description of the 
major steps of defense planning 
The second part of this thesis deals with the Strategy-to-Task Resource 
Management method. After a general description of STRM and the role of hierarchies in 
defense resource planning, the thesis will analyze the major levels of the STRM method, 
examining national security objectives, national military objectives, missions, operational 
tasks, force elements to accomplish tasks, capabilities and defense resources. This part 
will include the analysis of the case of Hungary's participation in NATO peace 
operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) from the STRM aspect: 
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The third main part of the thesis deals with the role of priority setting in the 
Strategy-to-Task Resource Management model. This part mainly will discuss the 
application of Multiattribute utility function analysis (MAUFA) for defense resource 
planning and allocation and the process of priority setting with Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
The thesis will provide benefits in defense planning in several ways. First, it will 
illustrate a useful tool, the hierarchy approach, for political and military decision-makers 
to understand the connection between the basic national security needs and the tasks of 
the defense forces. This understanding can help the decision-makers to make decisions 
that provide a better resource allocation among the government branches and within the 
defense sector. Second, the thesis will present and study two different analytic 
approaches to support resource· allocation decisions by using the hierarchy. These two 
approaches help decision-makers in the resource allocation process by ranking 
alternatives. It makes prioritization easier. Overall, the main benefit of the thesis is to 
provide a new, clear and comprehensive approach to defense planning. 
5 
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II. OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
Before studying the Strategy-to-Task Resource Management method, it is 
important to provide an overview of defense planning. It is essential to understand the 
objectives, participants and the different steps of defense planning, as well as the 
different commonly used planning methods. 
A. OBJECTIVES OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
To understand the objectives of defense planning it is necessary to study the role 
of planning in organizations and the various planning functions in budgetary decisions. 
1. The role of planning 
Planning has long been an important activity in both government and private 
business organizations. It provides a sense of direction to the organization by informing 
members of the organization about the organization's goals and the general types of 
policies, which the organization intends to pursue to achieve those objectives. 
The plans having the greatest resource-allocation impact are those, which specify 
the activities an agency intends to pursue over some future period, because activities are 
directly accompanied by resource consumption. Defense planning is.included in this type 
of planning. These plans differ in their content; however they have some common 
elements. They include a forecast of the environment in which the agency will be 
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operating, a statement of the objectives the agency wants to pursue. Furthermore, plans 
contain a discussion of how the agency intends to go about pursuing those objectives and 
also address the resources required to achieve the objectives. 
2. Planning functions in budgetary decisions 
Plans have many important implications for budgetary decisions. The first major 
function of the plan is to signal the current budgetary decisions that must be made in 
order to realize future programs. Only by planning what will be used in the future can a 
decision-maker know what is needed to be done now. The advanced procurement of long 
lead-time items is a good example for this function. 
The second function of the plan is to give an agency some idea of its future 
requirements for existing assets and for assets that can be acquired. Weapon systems are 
good example for this function. They may be effective now, but do not satisfy 
requirements in ten years time. 
The third function is the consideration of the utilization of existing resources. If 
the military has equipment no longer needed because the function it performed is no 
longer necessary, the utilization of this equipment for future programs has to be decided. 
Proper planning can help in answering this matter by showing the future requirements of 
the organization. Decision makers can then decide whether this equipment could be 
useful for the organization in later time or not. 
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B. PLANNING APPROACHES 
Countries live in different political, economic and cultural environments. These 
environments strongly influence the general approaches to different social issues. For 
example, when an economy is weak, and there are very limited resources for defense, all 
military "needs" will probably not be satisfied. In different situations different planning 
approaches have to be used in order to ensure the most effective and efficient resource 
allocation for and within defense. There is no best approach for all situations. Every 
country should find a combination of the following approaches that fits best for its 
political, economic and cultural environment. 
When studying the different approaches, two points have to be considered 
critically. One is the allocation of scarce resources and the other is the relationship 
among ends, means and risks. According to the first argument, there will never be 
enough resources to satisfy all the nation's needs. Therefore, decision-makers have to 
establish requirements, set priorities, make decisions and allocate scarce resources to the 
most critical needs. To get the most from the limited national resources (means), 
decision-makers must determine their objectives (where they want to go) and the strategy 
(how they plan to get there). In some cases it becomes necessary to adjust security 
objectives (ends) to fit within the borders of the nation's economic, political, and military 
power (means). The mismatch between these two elements creates some danger (risk) to ··· 
the overall security interests. 
9, 
1. Bottom-up Approach 
In the Bottom-up approach current capabilities and resources play a dominant roJe 
in defense planning. This approach tends to focus on current resources and threats. 
The major advantage of using this approach is that is based on local reality. 
Defense planners are obliged to see how existing objectives can be reached by using 
currently available resources. Therefore, it can help to balance the efforts focusing only 
on the contribution of future capabilities and resources. Second, by concentrating on 
existing forces, this can lead to improved strategies that can help to refine force 
requirements. 
The major disadvantage of using only this approach could _be that a tendency to 
lose sight of national security objectives could occur. Another pitfall of this approach is 
that it could lead to neglect oflong-term goals. 
2. Top-down Approach 
In this defense planning approach objectives play an essential role. These 
objectives drive the whole defense planning process. The first step is to decide what the 
decision-makers want to achieve. The next step is to develop a strategy or game plan that 
specifies how the objectives will be accomplished. After defining the objectives and the 
strategy, forces are determined. This approach is a good way to minimize the risk 
associated with military threats to vital national interests. 
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This approach continues through a hierarchy of several levels of objectives and 
strategy. At the highest level, where national security decisions are made, broad 
objectives and grand strategies are developed to further or defend overall national interest 
such as to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, 
to contribute to the implementation of what has been laid down in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and to the security of its Allies or to facilitate the preservation of 
international peace and the enhancement of the security and stability in the region. 
At a lower level individual objectives and strategies are being developed that 
support higher level decisions. Continuing the example of preservation of international 
peace and implementing obligations associated with NATO's strategy to focus on out of 
area peace operations, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement; the military. 
objective could be participation in NATO peacekeeping operations. At an even lower 
level there are theater objectives and strategies. 
There are many advantages of using a Top-Down approach in defense planning. 
First, going through the hierarchy, it helps defense planners to focus on ends. Second, it 
gives a systematic way to think through defense requirements starting from the macro 
perspective and going down to micro tasks. Third, this approach manages different 
timelines. At the highest, national security level, objectives and strategy are rather longer 
term. The lower the level, the shorter the range of the focus becomes. Fourth, if the 
strategy is clearly defined, it will help as a valuable criteria for judging, evaluating and 
choosing among for example different defense force structures. The fifth advantage is 
that this approach can be summarized in a simple model. When a threat or opportunity 
11 





Figure 1. Relationship between Strategy, Objectives, Resources and Risks 
When objectives and existing resources are not in balance, defense planners are faced 
with a mismatch between objectives and resources that will produce a high level of risk. 
Sometimes in this case, the planners tend to concentrate only on increasing the means. 
Nonetheless, there are other solutions for this situation like more clearly defined or 
limited objectives, a different strategy, or the definite acceptance of the risk coming from 
the mismatch. In the first two cases the information goes back to the top level and leads 
to changes in objectives and/or strategies. This feedback loop ensures that the balance 
between strategies and means can be achieved. 
While there are much strength associated with the top-down approach, there may 
be several pitfalls of using this approach for defense planning. First, there is a tendency 
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of future-oriented concepts' dominance at the expense of current forces and resources. 
Second, it leads to greater public awareness of strategy. This implies that strategy will be 
debated openly during the budget process and questions of state security may arise. 
3. Fiscal Approach 
The fiscal approach to defense planning is budget driven. Overall budget 
constraints are established at the outset based on a criterion such as a certain percentage 
of gross national product1 or the Central Budget2. Within this limit other planning 
approaches are integrated to make the most of what is available. 
The first advantage of this approach is that resources for defense are placed in the 
context with the overall state of the economy and the political emphasis of the public at 
large toward defense and other goods. The $econd strength is that additional focus is 
placed on efficiency and effectiveness3• Because the costs of operating current forces will 
constrain the amount of resources remaining for research and development and 
modernization, there are incentives to operate efficiently. 
The primary weakness of this approach is that it might not be directly related to 
the threat level. The second pitfall of the Fiscal approach is that when planning starts 
1 Hungary, for instance, agree.d on increasing the percentage of defense portion of the gross domestic 
product within the next years by 0.1 percent-point. 
2 Central Budget represent Federal Budget in this paper 
3 Effectiveness is used in this context as 'efficiency in the large'. According to Hitch and McKean (The 
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p. 125) "Efficiency in the large, or at relatively high levels, 
involves getting the gross allocations right in reference to major objectives." 
13 
-- - ---------------------------------------
with a fiscal emphasis, the focus tends to be on the apportionment of overall resources 
instead of the optimal combined military solution to common problems. 
C. PARTICIPANTS OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
Defense planning is a dynamic process that involves many participants both from 
the military and non-military side. These participants have different interest and different 
power to represent their interest in the defense planning process. The following examples 
represent the Hungarian perspective. 
1. Elected Politicians (Parliament) 
As far as democracy is concerned, freely elected political representatives and 
governments play a significant role in governing a country. Representatives deal with 
defense issues on the highest level. Based on their understanding of national interest, 
constraints on national power and both external and internal pressures, they have to 
identify national objectives. These objectives then show up in foreign and defense 
policies. Usually parliaments4 have at least two committees that play a significant role in 
forming defense issues. They participate, therefore, in defense planning. These 
committees are the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Committee. Defense 
Committees work on all defense issues occurring in the Parliament. They have to prepare 
House resolutions on issues like the principles of national defense, principles of security 
and defense policy, use of defense forces and long term transformation of defense forces 
4 Parliament represents Congress and National Assembly in the paper. 
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and their size. These functions are very important in both defense planning and 
implementing an effective civilian control over the military. 
2. The Administration5 (Ministry of Defense) 
Different ministries of the government deal with different issues. The Ministry of 
Defense is responsible for the day-to-day business of defense issues, including resource 
allocation problems, budgetary issues and the question of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Top leaders of the Ministry of Defense are the decision-makers in these issues. The 
different departments within the MoD deal with special segments of defense, like human 
resource, infrastructure, and budgeting, bilateral and multilateral international relations. 
Defense planning is a crucial part of this business; therefore MoD's participation in the 
process is essential. 
3. Military Planners 
After foreign and defense policy has been determined, the military becomes 
involved into the defense planning process. They make assessments about how to 
balance the current and possible threat by using resources available to the military. They 
look for a force structure that fits best to national military objectives. Since this part of 
the planning requires special knowledge about military resources (e.g. human resources, 
training and practice, weapons, special equipment, operation and maintenance 
requirements) the core of actual defense planning is carried out by military planners. 
5 Administration represents the governing body of a country (government) 
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Military planners should focus on allocating resources (human and financial resources 
and infrastructure) in order to assure achieving certain capabilities required for 
implementing certain military tasks. 
D. THE MAJOR STEPS OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
Defense planning is a dynamic process that involves many participants both from 
the military and non-military side. Defense planning can be described in a five-step 
process. In the first step purposes are specified. The second step appraises opposition. 
The third step formulates strategy to satisfy objectives. In step four resources are 
allocated in order to cover requirements without excessive level of risk. The last step is 
to review alternatives in case current assets are inadequate to support the selected 
concept. 
1. Specifying purposes 
Defense planning must seek ways to protect and promote various interests that 
form the foundation for national security. 
· As an example, preserving independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the country is basic national interest of the Republic of Hungary. Defense planners 
should keep these interests in mind, since the whole planning process exists in order to 
protect these interests. 
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2. Appraising Opposition 
The nature, closeness and intensity of obvious danger determine what should and 
could be done in what order of priority to protect national interest form all foes. Adequate 
evaluation starts with enemy capabilities6• 
3. Formulating strategy 
Defense planning should include different strategies for different cases. 
According to Collins's Law "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how 
to do it."7 Proper political and military objectives thus have to describe at the beginning 
what must be done to obtain desired level of security. In a scarce resource environment 
A conflict exists between domestic goals and the needs for national defense. Priorities 
therefore are crucial in order to establish an effective and efficient allocation of national 
resources. Concept formulation starts with policy guidelines, keeping national aims in 
mind. Thereupon defense planners fit operational concepts into the policy-commitment 
framework, in ways they believe would best achieve objectives selected to safeguard 
national interest. 
4. Allocating resources 
Conceptual planning identifies what should be done to provide crucial security 
interests. Resource allocation compares the requirements coming from the upper level 
6 In case of Hungary this is rather difficult, because according to the Resolution 94/1998 (XII.29.) of the 
National Assembly on the Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary 
paragraph 5 states that ''The Republic of Hungary considers no country an enemy and it treats all actors of 
the international politics who abide by the principles of international law as its partners. Hungary intends to 
settle disputes in accordance with international law, taking into account the European practice." 
7 John M. Collins. Defense Planning Steps. p.145, 1990. 
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strategies with available and projected capabilities, in terms of human resource, 
equipment, infrastructure and funds, to approve or reject its feasibility. Priorities also 
occur in the process of resource allocation, since decisions are made according to 
priorities established within strategies. In case expectations and resources fit completely, 
the defense planning process terminates at this point. If there is misfit between them, 
steps must be taken. 
5. Reconciling end with means 
Reconciliation is required when unallowable risks maintain the gap between 
objectives and resources. Collins suggests six choices to implement reconciliation. These 
are the following: reduce waste, compress or discard objectives, reshape strategic 
concepts, revise force requirements, increase resources or bluff. These choices could be 
used singly or in combination. Collins pinpoints som~ sensitive points in the process: 
Planners must be cautious, because reducing risks can be a risky business. Reducing 
waste is properly top priority, but trimming "fat" can cause serious problems, if careless 
surgeons cut into "muscle." Telescoping objectives and tinkering with strategies is less 
likely to stir up political storms than requests for more resources. Critical interests, 
however, remain and must be covered. Overoptimizing forces for any set of concepts 
stifles flexibility. Bluster sometimes holds foes at bay, but habitual bluff is bound to be a 
looser.8 
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Figure 2. Defense Planning Process9 









Defense planning is a complex process. This chapter discussed the objectives and 
the participants of defense planning and the different planning approaches. The analysis 
of the different approaches showed that the top-down approach should be dominant 
factor, when planning is based on objectives. The next chapter will study such an 
objective-based defense planning approach. However, defense planning is unlikely to be 
based on only one approach. The appearance of some parts of other approaches is 
inevitable. The next chapter examines a new defense-planning model that is new in its 
approach, because it connects national security objectives to military tasks. 
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III. STRATEGY-TO-TASK RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is a strong need in planning of military forces and capabilities for a clearer 
sense of linkage and direction to national interest. The annual reports of the executive 
branch of a country, to the legislative body, should explicitly show the national interests 
and objectives. It is important, because the legislative body has to make budgetary 
decisions, based on the importance of the different programs. On one hand, it makes it 
easier for the representatives to allocate resources among the different programs and task 
for the Ministry of Defense. On the other hand as far as a Ministry can show how the 
programs, or tasks of the ministry are directly related to nation~ interest, the ministry has 
a bigger chance to get the requested funds than other ministries have. 
B. STRM: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE DECISION-MAKING 
The Strategy-to-Task Resource Management model meets the above-described 
necessity of linking military tasks to fundamental national interests. This concept is 
based on the argument that a plan for accomplishing certain goals at one level of 
organization defines objectives to be attained at subordinate levels of accomplishment. 
Therefore, plans for the Ministry of Defense determine objectives for main main 
departments within the Ministry of Defense and for the armed forces. 
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1. General description of STRM 
The Strategy-to-Task Resource Management Model describes a process by which 
one may move consistently from established national security objectives, to national 
military objectives, to regional campaign objectives, to missions, and finally to military 
tasks. The model gives a clear audit path from top to bottom, offers a definite stability 
for national security planning and provides clear meaning to strategies10 formulated at 
each level. 
2. Hierarchies in d~fense resource planning 
The hierarchy of defense planning objectives starts with national security 
objectives, obtained from the requirement of protecting the country's basic goals down to 
exact military tasks. Figure 3 shows the hierarchy of defense planning related objectives. 
Strategies are determined each level in reaction to perceptions of the threat and 
the environment. While strategists at the national security level define national security 
objectives, planners at the national military level idyntify national military objectives and 
regional campaign objectives to support the higher level objectives. Afterwards, regional 
·commanders and planners identify missions in campaign plans and military tasks te>' be 
achieved in a theory of employment. Feedback is crucial, because it helps in 
10 Strategies refer to plans of action. According to the Joint Dictionary of Military Terminology, a strategy 
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Figure 3. Hierarchy of Objectives Relating to Defense Planning11 
modifying plans in response to changing fiscal and operational coercion and the altering 
threat. 
11 Source: Kent, Simons: "Objective-based planning" in "New Challenges for Defense Planning". p. 63. 
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C. MAJOR LEVELS OF STRM: ANALYSIS OF STRM THROUGH THE CASE 
OF HUNGARIAN FORCES PARTICIPATION IN NATO PEACE 
OPERATIONS 
This part of the thesis analyzes the major levels of STRM, starting with national 
security objectives, through missions, and finishing with defense resources. In order to 
show the practical use of the model; the thesis will focus on how the model could be used 
for determining defense resources for participation of Hungarian forces in NATO peace 
operations. This illustrative example does not, however, represent a comprehensive or 
precise list of Hungarian national security and military objectives. 
The model used the structure established in the Joint Exercise Management 
Package (JEMP) ill software, developed by the Dynamics Research Corporation. JEMP 
draws on Strategy-to-Task framework to connect missions and tasks that can be used in a 
broader hierarchy of objectives for defense. The software makes it possible for the user, 
to analyze any mission, operational objective, by breaking down these objectives into 
different tasks. When these tasks are identified and aligned by the mission phase, then 
conditions could be described for each task. In the last step, performance standards are 
assigned for each task to establish a measurable base for task evaluation. JEMP also 
connects the missions to different doctrines, therefore making possible to connect the 
missions with higher level objectives. 
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1. Peace operations and NATO's role in peace operations 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) became a more important mission 
of the military after the cold war. Besides counter drug and anti-terrorist operations, 
peace operations are considered the most important missions of the MOOTW. Usually 
three types of peace operations are differentiated: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. It is important to deeply analyze these different types, because the tasks of 
the military forces are different in the every case. 
a) Peacemaking 
Peacemaking is an effort to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or 
other forms of peaceful settlement. Peacemaking is normally carried out by diplomats 
and politicians. It combines negotiation with nonmilitary tools of coercion to achieve a 
resolution of a conflict. When these tools are inadequate, military tools may be used to 
establish and maintain, forcibly if necessary, a cessation of hostilities. 
Peacemaking normally goes before the initiation of military operations. 
Depending on its success, peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation is in place after 
the peacemaking process. Peacemaking occurs simultaneously with, and continues 
throughout the duration of, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The 
political goals and objectives established for the peacemaking effort help define the 
military objectives of the intervening forces and provide the commander parameters 
within which to develop supporting operational planning and execution. Thus, 
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peacemaking constitutes the political framework for application of military force. 
Without a peacemaking effort, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations will 
always fail. 
b J Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping includes the prevention, containment, moderation and termination 
of hostilities between or within states, through peaceful third-party intervention organized 
and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to 
maintain peace. There are two important factors to be aware of concerning peacekeeping 
operations: 
• Peacekeeping forces must be perceived as neutral by all disputing parties. 
• Peacekeeping forc~s must always be prepared for a quickly changing environment 
in which peace enforcement or combat may occur. 
Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the 
belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution. 
Peacekeeping operations may take many forms of supervision and monitoring: 
• Withdrawals and Disengagements 
• Cease-fires 
• Prisoner-of-War Exchanges 
• Arms Control 
• Demilitarization and Demobilization 
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These operations, therefore, require only passive participation from the forces. 
Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the 
peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The greatest military consideration in 
peacekeeping is the political objective of the operation. 
Normally, a peacekeeping force will deploy after the fighting has ceased. The 
nationality of the force is agreed to by the belligerents. The typical peacekeeping force 
has historically been a lightly armed, defensively oriented observer force that physically 
separates former combatants. It observed and reported its adherence to the cease-fire 
while negotiations for peace occurred. Its mission usually involves monitoring and 
supervising a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants. 
Peacekeeping forces assume that use of force will not be required to carry out 
their tasks, except in self-defense. Therefore, these operations do not require significant 
command and control systems. The contribution of independent states may only need to 
be administratively coordinated by supra-national organizations. 
c) Peace enforcement 
Military operations by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security, whether or not the belligerents are consenting to 
the intervention. 
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By definition: peace enforcement operations are military operations (including 
possible combat actions) in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between 
belligerents who may be engaged in combat activities. The following factors have to be 
considered in connection with peace enforcement: 
• it does not have to end in combat, 
• it is a subset of armed intervention, 
• intervention force not perceived as neutral, 
• an international mandate is required. 
In a situation for which peace enforcement operations are required, armed conflict 
and not peace best describes the situation. Also, one or more of the belligerents usually 
prefers it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, ,peace enforcers are not 
welcomed by one of the belligerents. Rather, the peace enforcers are active fighters who 
must force a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants. In this process, they 
may be unable to preserve their neutrality. 
Peace enforcement operations may be beyond the UN s ability to plan, command, 
and control. If this occurs, they may be carried out by a coalition of countries or by a 
regional organization such as NATO. 
Because the forces involved in peace enforcement may use arms against the 
belligerents, sufficient military strength must be deployed to achieve the objectives 
established by political authorities. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement will require a full 
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range of military capabilities that has the potential to meet or exceed that of the 
belligerents. Although the preferred objective is the commitment of superior military 
force to dissuade belligerents from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations 
should assume, at least for planning purposes, that the use of force will be necessary to 
restore peace. But unlike war, enforcement operations are more constrained by political 
factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table. Settlement, not victory, 
is the goal. 
The peace enforcement units will presumably have to fight its way into the 
combat zone and use force to physically separate the combatants. 
There is a danger in believing that peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace 
enforcement situations. Peace enforcement requires very different forces than does 
peacekeeping. While peacekeeping requires mainly passive force participation, peace 
enforcement usually demands active military involvement. This active participation . 
makes it much easier to use performance standards for planning and evaluating the 
implementation of military task for this type of peace operation. 
d) Hungary's involvement in NA'l'O peace operations 
As peace operations are concerned, Hungary participated in several peacekeeping 
operations (Cypress, Angola, Mozambique, Bosnia). Her active participation in the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia was considered 
to be a significant factor of inviting Hungary to join NATO. In her new status, a member 
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of the NATO Alliance, Hungary's effort in peace operations will probably change. There 
could be a change that shifts more emphasis from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. 
On the one hand countries participating in peacekeeping operations make their 
contribution to international peace with significant autonomy. Therefore, Hungary's 
NATO membership will not lead to a significant change in its method of operation. On 
the other hand, because peace enforcement operations will be carried out by groups of 
states and regional alliances, which have the necessary means to implement the mission, 
NATO's command and control responsibilities in this type of peace operations will 
increase. Consequently, Hungary as a member of NATO probably will play a more 
active role in these operations. Nonetheless, these operations consist of different 
objectives and require different means from participating forces than peacekeeping 
operations. The next part of the thesis will study the structure of STRM model, through 
focusing on Hungary's participation in NATO's peace operations (mainly in peace 
enforcement). 
2. National Security Objectives 
National security objectives compose the first level of objectives in the STRM 
model. These objectives usually contain all instruments of national power, including 
political, economic, and military power. The new Hungarian national security objectives 
address security in a broader term, which includes finance, huinan rights, minority rights, 
infomiation and technology, environment, and international law. 
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National security objectives are derived from the threats to the country's 
fundamental goals. These goals are stated in the country's Constitution. Article V of the 
Hungarian Constitution states that the State .of the Republic of Hungary safeguards the 
freedom of the people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and the 
national borders registered in international treaties. Based on these basic goals the 
National Assembly has defined the principles and objectives of the national security of 
the Republic of Hungary.12 These objective include: 
• to guarantee the independence, sovereign statehood and territorial integrity of the 
country; 
• to create appropriate conditions for enforcing the principles laid down in the 
Constitution, to promote the predominance of the rule of law, the unperturbed 
functioning of democratic institutions and market economy and to contribute to 
the internal stability of the country; 
• to promote the full respect of civil and human rights and the rights of national and 
ethnic minorities in the Republic of Hungary; 
• to create appropriate conditions for the assurance of personal, material and social 
safety of people living on the territory of the Republic of Hungary and the 
preservation of national assets; 
12 After the end of the Cold Wax, Resolution 27/1993 (23 April) of the Hungarian National Assembly was 
issued to define the principles of the national defense of the Republic of Hungary. The first part of the 
resolution dealt with the principles and objectives of national defense policy. At the end of 1998 these 
policies had been reviewed according to the fundamental changes in the external security situation of 
Hungary, mainly because of the achievements made in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration. Resolution 
94/1998 (29 December) of the National Assembly on the Principles of the Security and Defense Policy was 
published to form security objectives to fit to the new security environment. 
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• to contribute to the implementation of what has been laid down in the North 
Atlantic Treaty and to the security of its Allies; 
• to facilitate the preservation of international peace and the enhancement of the 
security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and its neighborhood; 
• to contribute to the assurance of appropriate conditions for the international 
economic, political, cultural and other relations and co-operation of the Republic 
of Hungary. 
The following figure shows a possible hierarchy of objectives that describes the 
relations between national security objectives and defense tasks. The figure focuses on 
peace operations and contains a more detailed description of the objectives within the 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. 
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Figure 4. Hierarchy of National Defense of Hungary, Peace Operations 
The document states that "the Republic of Hungary wishes to realize the above 
objectives in accordance with the Constitution, the norms of international law, with 
special respect to the principles and obligations enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations Organization, in the documents of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the Council of Europe, in the North Atlantic Treaty and, 
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furthermore, in compliance with its obligations undertaken in other relevant international 
documents, regional and bilateral agreements." 13 
Hungary builds her security on two pillars: the national resources on the one hand, 
and Euro-Atlantic integration and international co-operation on the other. 
3. National Military Objectives 
National military objectives constitute the second level of objectives in the model. 
While national security objectives contain all instruments of national power, national 
military objectives state those objectives to be achieved through the use of military 
means. The resolution of ·the National Assembly also determined the main military 
objectives of its Armed Forces. The main task of the Armed Forces is the defense of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Hungary and contribution to the Alliance's 
collective defense. Furthermore, the Armed Forces are required to contribute to other 
jointly perceived allied missions of international peace operations, engage in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out under the auspices of international 
organizations. The next level of the hierarchy will study the missions of these peace 
_operations. 
13 Legal background. http:/1193.6.238.52/ MOD/jogi_e.htm [Available Online] 
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4. Missions 
Below national military objectives, missions constitute the third level of the 
modei. There are four types of these missions: force employment, military operations 
other than war, planning and support. Within military operations other than war several 
operations can be differentiated: 
• Combating terrorism (counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism), 
• Peace operations (peacekeeping, peacemaking ~d peace enforcement), 
• Counter-drug operations and 
• Humanitarian assistance. 
The model focuses on peace operations and has a detailed hierarchy of objectives 
and tasks in this area. Obviously, it is possible to establish such a hierarchy for the other 
missions. This model intended to demonstrate the idea of Strategy-to-Task model 
througli studying peace operations; however the hierarchical methodology can be applied 
to other operations and missions. 
Peace operations are divided into three types of missions: peacekeeping, peace-
making and peace enforcement. Each mission requires implementation of different 
objectives and tasks from the armed forces. 
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5. Objectives 
At the next level, objectives are formulated by the Major Operational Commands. 
They are the specific actions that must be petformed in order to achieve a mission. Each 
objective is defined by a concept of employment. This concept of employment interlaces 
together the different systems, organizations, and tactics required to achieve a particular 
task in an end-to-end manner. 
Tasks are means to achieve objectives. Every theater objective has at least one 
operational task related to it. Individual tasks could be broken down in order to separate 
different ways of accomplishing objectives; therefore pinpointing critical activities 
necessary to achieve an objective. This concept of employment specifies capabilities 
. needed to achieve objectives and allows association of force elements "With 
accomplishing missions. 
Tasks cannot be performed unless all of the required capabilities are provided at a 
minimal level. When assessing the abilities to accomplish a task, concepts of operations 
(and their required capabilities) and the resourcing of program elements must be 
considered. 
In case of peacekeeping operations, the model identified the following objectives: 
supervising cease-fires, movements observation, disarming military forces, providing 
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security to population, training and leading de-mining teams and protecting humanitarian 
aid convoys. 
Peace enforcement requires different objectives. The model includes the 
following objectives for these operations: force deployment/conducting maneuver, 
developing intelligence, employing firepower, performing logistics and combat support, 
exercising command and control and protecting the force. 14 
These objectives consist of several tasks. The importance of the tasks is that they 
have a more narrow definition and it is easier to create performance standards for them. 
The model includes several tasks for each objective under peace enforcement. For 
instance the objective, Perform logistics and combat support, has five tasks: provide 
personnel, base and mission support, conduct resource management and equipping the 
force. Other objectives have sequential tasks, which are following each other in the 
implementation. This results a particular interaction among the different performance 
standards, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
6. Performance Standards 
Performance measures or performance standards contain the last level of the 
model. Measures of performance simply reflect some aspect of observable performance. 
14 The objectives used for peace enforcement are based on the task list available in the Joint Exercise 
Management Package III. Developed by the Dynamics Research Corporation. 
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It is possible to assign several performance standards for each task. The performance 
standards in the model are developed for this thesis only for demonstration purposes. 
It is important to distinguish performance measures, measures of performance 
from measures of utility. While these terms have often been used interchangeably, there 
is a significant difference between them. Unlike performance measures, measures of 
utility directly index the contribution level of task performance to objectives for 
operations or missions. The utility associated with achieving a particular perfomiance 
level is measured by using a Single Utility Function (SUP). To compare the utilities 
determined by the different SUFs, the model uses different weights, which were 
determined by a consulting group to make the model more realistic. In defense planning 
these weights could be determined by teams or working groups coming from different 
parts of the defense establishment, to ensure an acceptable level of reality. Chapter IV 
includes a detailed description of the methods used for weight setting. 
Therefore, performance measures simply describe the levels of performance 
without attempting to connect them directly to mission success. 
7. Resource management in Strategy-to-Task 
An end-to-end concept of operations describes capabilities required to accomplish 
tasks and permits association of force elements, programs, with achieving missions. 
Assessments of our ability to accomplish the tasks depend on the concepts of operation 
considered as well as the resources available for the different program elements. There is 
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an additional category to consider for the model. These are the force elements; most of 
that may also be called programs. Tasks are accomplished by using force elements. 
Basically, it is a sequenced application of capabilities. The capabilities can be 
accomplished by one or more force elements alone or in combination. The different 
programs would include linkages to capabilities and tasks. For every program an audit 
trail would be developed to assess the capabilities and the ability to perform certain tasks 
using these capabilities. Force elements could be the distinct, fundable military programs 
most visible to the Parliament and to the public. All defense programs should be linked 
through aggregated capabilities by using a framework to provide a better context for 
resource decision-making. 
The key point of this framework is that resource issues must be addressed by 
explicitly using linkages of resources to supported objectives in decision-making and in 
program development. When an issue, such as canceling or cutting funds for force 
elements participating in peacekeeping programs arises in the budgetary process, the 
MoD would quickly be able to identify tasks and missions influenced by peacekeeping 
programs, and assess the effects of the reduction on other high objectives. 
Regular reviews of the programs would ensure that updated information is 
available for decision-making on defense resource allocation and budgeting. During the 
program review, national and military objectives influenced by the program would be 
identified. The hierarchy of objectives, the Strategy-to-Task model would help to 
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determine these linkages. The implication of changes in resourcing on missions would be 
simply displayed. Assessment of current and future adequacy of the program would be 
included in the debate. If principal and related higher level objectives and task are not 
met or supported by the program, then alternatives for achieving these objectives are 
identified. It is important to emphasize the need to consider tradeoffs at all levels. 
D. CHAPTERSUMMARY 
This chapter focused on describing the Strategy-to-Task model through the 
example of Hungary's participation in NATO peacekeeping operation. The model starts 
with national objectives based on basic national needs, goes through military objectives 
and missions, and stops at the level of tasks achieved through performance standards. 
The model drew a map of the hierarchy of objectives in the field of defense and national 
security. By using this hierarchy basically all military tasks could be linked to military 
and national security objectives through missions. This linkage would help planners and 
decision-makers basically in the MoD and the Parliament to understand the consequences 
of resourcing and budgeting decisions. The model enables decision-makers to understand 
.how a reduction of funds for a certain program would influence attaining higher-level 
military and national security objectives. 
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IV. SETTING PRIORITIES IN THE STRATEGY-TO-TASK MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first three chapters described the hierarchy of objectives that can be 
established for national security planning. This hierarchy goes from the nation's need for 
defense, through national security, military objectives and missions to the tasks necessary 
to implement these objectives. For certain tasks, performance standards may be 
available. This hierarchy of objectives creates a multi-attribute decision making situation 
for defense planners, where they have to chose between alternatives according to each 
alternative's contribution to the implementation of the different sets of objectives. 
This chapter will study the two well-known methods for decision-making, the 
Multiattribute Utility Function Analysis (MAUFA) and the AnalYtic Hierarchy Process · 
(AHP). Benefits and pitfalls and potential use of both methods will be discussed in this 
·chapter. These methods can help decision-makers to understand the relationship between 
objectives on the same and different levels and use this information in resource 
management decisions. The same model, the Hungarian participation in NATO peace 
operations, is used to illustrate these two methods. 
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The first section will study the situations, where numeric measurements could be 
applied. In these cases the Multiattribute Utility Function Analysis gives a better 
approach to foster decision-makers to choose between alternatives. 
B. ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES WITH MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY 
FUNCTION ANALYSIS (MAUFA) 
Decision-makers in the field of defense always face situations where they are 
forced to allocate resources between alternatives that differ in many attributes and related 
different sets of objectives. In comparing the alternatives in the field of defense, the 
highest question always comes down to study how well the different alternatives 
influence the ultimate goai of the hierarchy, to sustain the survival of the nation. The 
decision maker can use the model of hierarchy of objectives, the Strategy-to-Task model, 
to analyze how strongly the individual factors of the lowest level of the hierarchy, the 
tasks and the different force elements, affect the objective on the top. By making this 
comparison, better decisions could be made. However, the comparison of these multi-
attribute alternatives requires a stable, consistent and reliable decision-making model. 
Usually, it is possible to measure performances of different tasks with one or 
more standards. For these cases, Multiattribute Utility Function Analysis provides a 
bett~r approach to the solution. 
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1. Description ofMAUFA 
In most cases, when decision-makers face complex situations, they are able to 
directly assign values to different objectives, their tasks and performance standards. 
They can determine how much they value a certain amount of the task within a given 
relevant interval. In economics this value is measured in a common unit, called utility. 
fu a complex situation, when several tasks are connected to objectives, decision:...makers 
have to measure performance and decide how these performances contribute to 
implement the tasks and the objectives. Therefore, a measure of performance could be 
used develop the utility of each performance, and weights could be used to determine the 
importance of the performance in terms of the tasks and the objective. We shall assume 
that the decision-maker's preferences can be represented by a function of added and 
weighted utilities. This function is the multi-attribute utility function. 15 
The next section deals with the application of MAUF analysis through the 
example of participating in peace enforcement operations. 
2. Setting priorities with applying MAUFA (peace enforcement example) 
According to Figure 4, peace operations consist of peacekeeping, peace making 
and peace enforcement operations. As described in Chapter III, peace enforcement 
operations contain several objectives and tasks. There are several performance standards 
15 Appendix B provides a more detailed discussion of the additive multiattribute utility functions. 
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that could be assigned to these objectives. Figure 5 shows the objectives used for peace 
enforcement in the model. 




Perform logistics and 
combat support 
Exercise command and 
control 
Protect the force 
Figure 5. Peace Enforcement Objectives 
Table 1 shows the tasks for these objectives and the performance standards 
associated with the tasks. 
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Objective Task Performance standard 
Force deployment/conduct Deploy forces Percent of forces deployed 
maneuver 
Assess area of operations Area assessed 
Position communication System positioned 
and navigation systems 
Redeploy forces Forces redeployed 
Develop intelligence Plan and direct tactical Intel implemented vs. planned 
L intelligence activities 
Collect information Information collected vs. 
planned 
Information level 
Process information Information processed 
Number of reports prepared 
Prepare intelligence Number of reports prepared I 
reports 
Emvloy firepower .Process targets Targets processed 
Employ air power Percent air power employed 
Control forces Control level 
Perform logistics and Provide personnel Level of support provided 
combat suvoort support 
Perform base suooort Level of suooort provided2 
Provide mission suooort Level of suooort provided I 
Conduct Resource Level of resource management 
mana.e:ement 
Eouip the force Force equipped 
Exercise command and Acquire and commu- Communication errors 
control nicate information 
Assess situation Accuracy of assessment 
Determine actions Number of Alternatives 
Direct and lead subor- Level of leadership 
dinate forces 
Protect the force Enhance survivability Survivability 
Provide force protection Casualties · 
Perform rescue Forces rescued 
Table 1. Objectives, Tasks and Performance Standards for Peace Enforcement 
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These standards are used to develop a single utility function for each task. These 
utilities then could be added, by using weights, to determine the utility function for a 
certain objective, for example developing intelligence, or ultimately, for the goal of peace 
enforcement. 
Single Utility Functions are developed for the different performance standards. 
The utility ranges between zero and one for each SUP. The least and the most preferred 
values represent the two endpoints for the horizontal axes. The "knee" of the curve 
represents the performance standard, at which an incremental increase in performance 
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Figure 7. Single Utility Function for Assess Area Task 
The model uses tradeoff curves among performance standards under a given 
objective by weighting the tasks. The tradeoff method defines weights by making 
pairwise comparisons between measures that define pairs of equally preferred simple 
alternatives. These tradeoff curves describe how the decision-maker is willing to change 
one performance, or objective, for another performance, or task. Figure 8 illustrates such 
a tradeoff curve. 
Besides the tradeoff curve the figure also shows the performance for the two 
alternatives studied in the model ( + ). The model can show pairwise utility functions 

















Figure 8. Tradeoff Curve for Tasks Deploy Forces and Assess Area 
Pairwise Utility Fwiction for Area assessed and Percent of forces deployed 
100 






Area assessed (P. er.cent) 
Figure 9. Pairwise Utility Function Curves 
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Each curve represents a certain level of utility that is the result of the 
combinations of the two performances. The shape of the curve illustrates the relationship 
between the two performances. The curvature comes directly from the curvature of the 
SUFs. Therefore, the shape of the SUFs determines the shape of the pairwise utility 
function. The model assumes that there is no interaction between the different tasks. 
After tradeoff curves have been established for the different tasks, decision-
makers have to determine weights for the next highest level in the hierarchy, the different 
objectives under a given mission, in the model under peace enforcement. The next figure 
illustrates such a tradeoff curve for two peace enforcement objectives: Protect the force 
and Employ firepower. 
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Figure 10. Tradeoffs Between Two Peace Enforcement Objectives 
What we are assuming is that the weights at the task level permit the utilities to be 
compared. At the objective leyel, therefore, the trade off curve is linear with a slope 
equal to minus one. 
When the weights are defined, decision-makers can analyze force alternatives for 
the operation. One alternative for the peace enforcement operation is to use general 
forces, a second is to establish specialized forces for this operation. The model gives an 
evaluation of the alternatives according to the utility level provided. 
In this setting general forces used in peace enforcement and peacekeeping could 
include a mechanized infantry division, or a light battalion of the army. This general 
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force would be equipped with weapons and be trained as if it was used for general 
military operation. The reason for using these troops would be based on their availability 
and closeness to the peace operations. 
The alternative specialized forces refer to forces specially designed for peace 
operations, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These forces would be 
specially trained and equipped for the mission of peace operations. Their special training 
could basically consist of reaction to the typical situations that occur in a peace operation 
environment. Some of their specialized equipment, such as special boots used for 
detecting and disabling mines, effectively could not be used for other operations. 
For illustrative purposes, the model used the following performance levels for the 
two alternatives for peace enforcement. 
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Performance General force Specialized force Unit 
Percent of forces deployed 80 80 Percent 
Area assessed 85 80 Percent 
System positioned 81 92 Percent 
Forces redeployed 70 75 Percent 
Intel implemented vs. 85 90 Percent 
planned 
Information collected vs. 88 95 Percent 
planned 
Information level Good Better 
Information processed 84 85 Percent 
Number of reports prepared 3 4 
Number of reports 2 2 
prepared I 
Targets processed 86 88 Percent 
Percent air power employed 85 75 Percent 
Control level Medium High 
Level of suooort provided High Medium 
Level of support provided2 Medium High 
Level of suooort provided 1 High High 
Level of resource Medium Medium 
management 
Force equipped 85 92 Percent 
Communication errors 3 2 
Accuracy of assessment Medium High 
Number of Alternatives 2 2 
Level of leadership High High 
Survivability 83 93 Percent 
Casualties 1 1 
Forces rescued 84 90 Percent 
Table 2. Performance Levels of the Alternatives 
The performance level for each alternative is converted to utilities by using the 
relevant Single Utility Functions. These single utilities then are aggregated according to 
their weights. Appendix A contains a detailed description of these weights. The obtained 
aggregated value of utility describes the alternatives that are comparable by using these 
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Figure 11. Alternative Utility for Peace Enforcement from Force Alternatives 
The utility of the alternatives can provide important information for the decision-
maker. The difference in utilities between the two alternatives provides useful 
information for assessing the two alternatives. The absolute utility received by choosing 
one alternative is also interesting. This level can be compared to a utility of 1.0, the 
highest possible utility and 0 the lowest utility level achieved with maximum and 
minimum performance, respectively, being obtained on all the performance standards. 
MAUFA could be used to assess the alternatives up to a certain level in the 
model. This level is limited partially by the ability to determine performance standards 
for objectives and tasks, and directly assign utilities to these performance standards. The 
model, therefore, used Multiattribute Utility Functions up to the level of peace 
enforcement operation. 
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3. Advantages and Shortfalls ofMAUFA 
MAUF A is a useful tool for decision-support in complex situations where 
attributes with petformance measures exist. In the model, these petformance standards 
exist under peace enforcement operations. The MAUF A provides more opportunities for 
decision-makers, than the last section showed. First, uncertainty could be built into the 
model to use an approach closer to reality. . Appendix B provides a more detailed 
description of how MAUFA can deal with uncertainty. Second, MAUFA can deal with 
situations, where there is not only a task-petformance standard relationship, but there is a 
relationship between the petf ormance standards under the same task. For instance, when 
the tas~s follow each other in a sequential manner, the petformance of the third in the 
row depends on the petformance of the second that depended on the first. In these 
situation the peiformance level on the first task has multiple influence on the utility 
calculated for the objective. 16 Appendix C of the thesis illustrates this situation. 
However, when identifying petformance standards is not obvious, like in case of 
peacekeeping, then using MUAFA to determine the Single Utility Functions is somewhat 
more difficult. In such cases instead of direct assessment of utility decision-makers may 
choose to use the Analytic Hierarchy Process method for evaluating the relationship and 
16 Because of the mutual utility dependence, these functions are calculated in different manner, by using 
multiplicative utility function. 
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setting priorities among objectives and tasks. The AHP tool could be a useful tool for 
these situations. 
C. APPLICATION OF AHP FOR DEFENSE RESOURCE PLANNING AND 
ALLOCATION 
The previous section studied situations where MAUFA could be used within our 
model hierarchical objectives. In these situations decision-makers can describe the 
attributes, measures or performance standards with numeric values. However, in some 
situations determining numeric values of the objectives is difficult or may not be 
possible. For instance, going higher on the hierarchy of objectives, decision-makers face 
more and more complex objectives. The more complex the objective is, the less possible 
it is to identify a performance standard for this objective. In these situations, pairwise 
comparison could be used to determine the relationship among objectives, and set 
priorities. The modified Analytic Hierarchy Process is a well-known analytic tool to use 
in these situations. 
1. Description of the original AHP model 
The process of decision-making is concerned with weighting options, all of which 
fulfill a set of desired objectives. The problem is to choose that alternative which best 
fulfills the entire set of objectives. The purpose of the process is to derive numerical 
weights for alternatives with respect to sub-objectives and for sub-objectives with respect 
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to higher order objectives. These numbers should provide adequate information for 
decision-makers helping them to allocate resources based on these priorities. 
Dr. Thomas L. Saaty, a professor of the University of Pennsylvania, introduced 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process in 1977. AHP was built to deal with complex real world 
situations. The method assumes that decision-makers have to face complex situations, 
where it is hard to assign certain numeric values to describe the different features of 
alternatives. Making simplifying assumptions about the world to suit the quantitative 
models is not sufficient. A realistic model should deal with complex situations as they 
are, and must include and measure all important tangible and intangible, quantitatively 
measurable and qualitative factors. 
According to the AHP model, the determination of the priorities of the lowest 
factors-relative to the goal, could be reduced to a sequence of priority problems, one for 
each level. The problem can, therefore, be reduced to a sequence of pairwise 
comparisons. Comparing two objective or attributes has the advantage of focusing 
exclusively on two objects at a time and on how they relate to each other. The 
disadvantage of this process is that it generates more information that is really necessary 
since each objective is systematically compared with every other. 
Another feature of AHP is the scaling used for describe the relation between two 
objectives or attributes. Sometimes it is impossible to assign direct numeric values to 
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objectives and then make the pairwise comparison. Therefore, during the process of 
pairwise comparison, decision-makers have to use a scale to express their preferences. 
This scale could consist of numeric values of (1,3,5,7,9) representing the relationship 
ranging from equal to extreme. The verbal scale could include equal, moderately more, 
strongly more, very strongly more and extremely more, standing for the numbers 
mentioned above. 
Hierarchies represent the most important elements in the decision situation and 
their relationship. However, hierarchies alone do not provide a very powerful tool for 
decision-making or plannin~. Decision-makers need a method to determine the potency 
with which the various elements in one level influence the elements on the next higher 
level. This method could foster computing the relative strengths of the impacts of the 
elements of the lowest level, through the hierarchy of objectives, on the overall objective. 
To determine the relative strengths, or the priorities, of the elements in one level 
relative to their importance for an element in the, next level, AHP creates a matrix of 
relationship among the elements. The values of this square matrix represent the 
·relationship between two elements on the same level, one showed in the given row and 
the other displayed in the column. After the necessary calculations have been 
implemented, decision-makers obtain information about the relative strengths of the 
different objectives of one level, concerning an objective on the next level.17 The process 
17 Appendix D contains detailed description of the calculation. 
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of creating these weightings through the whole hierarchy of objectives makes it possible 
to get a numeric value describing the relationship between the lowest level objectives, 
tasks, and the top goal. Appendix D gives an illustration of AHP through the example of 
buying a car. 
2. Shortfalls and possible modifications of AHP 
The AHP contains several possible problems. While two issues, scaling and 
ordering are serious matters; the problem of rank reversal is seen as the most significant 
issue regarding the usefulness of AHP. 
As James S. Dyer states in his Remarks on the Analytic Hierarchy Process, ''The 
difficulty can be simply stated as follows: Th~ ranking of alternatives determined by the 
AHP may be altered by the addition of another alternative for consideration." 18 
In some cases, when an additional alternative was to be considered, AHP can give 
a different result for decision makers, and show that their preference of alternatives has 
changed, even if the new alternative considered has the same attribute levels as an 
original alternative. A more detailed description of the rank reversal problem can be 
found in the literature. 19 
18 Management Science Vol. 36 No. 3, March 1990 p. 252. 
19 See, for example, Schoner and Wedley, Roper and Sharp and Belton and Gear. 
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The disregard for measurement units causes the problem of rank reversal; thus 
eliminating it would abolish rank reversal. Defining an underlying scale based on a 
standard could be a solution. Both the scale intervals and the standard can be 
discretionally chosen; however after they exist, measurements must be consistent with 
this scale. In this case, however, MAUF can be developed. 
In AHP, pairwise comparisons are limited to a nine-point integer scale. It leads to 
inconsistency since no attribute or alternative can be, for example, 2.5, 4.1 or 12 times 
more important than another. In other cases it is impossible compare alternatives by 
using AHP' s 9-point scale. Suppose, as an example, there are three alternatives, X, Y, 
and Z with the following comparison results. X has extreme importance over Y that 
means X over Y is 9, and Y has extreme importance over Z that is Y over Z is 9. The 
logical relationship between X and Z wbuld be 81. AHP, however, cannot describe 
consistently the relationship between X and Z, because the value for specify the most . 
extreme relationship is 9. 
There is a solution for this problem. First, the decision-maker should identify the 
extreme, the most and the least preferred, attributes. The least preferred attribute would 
be defined as one on the scale, and the most preferred would be defined as nine. In this 
method, all attributes would be within the scale. Following the example above, X, Y and 
Z might be defined by 9, 3 and 1 accordingly. 
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The AHP uses the eigenvector method, as illustrated in Appendix D, to determine 
the weights from pairwise comparisons. According to Hihn and Johnson, there is no 
reason to believe that AHP generates the most desirable solutions using the eigenvector 
technique. 
Alternatively, using the Least Square Error method to fit weights to alternatives or 
attributes ensures a more exact solution in the case of inconsistency in the decision-
maker's preferences. 
3. Applying AHP in the model of Hungarian participation in NATO peace 
operations(peacekeeping) 
As described in the last section, a modified version of the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process can be a useful tool in assigning weights to the different objectives in. complex 
situations, where numeric evaluation of the objectives is difficult. The following figure 
demonstrates a possible hierarchy of objectives that was described in the previous 
chapter. The hierarchy contains a detailed path starting from the top level objective and 
going down to the different tasks of peace operations, like peacekeeping, peace making 
and peace enforcement. This hierarchy meets the requirement of complexity described 
above; therefore AHP could be used for this part of the model. By pairwise comparison 
of the objectives that are on the same level, decision-makers can identify the relative 
imp~rtance of the objectives and identify their importance i:p. the objective on the next 
level. For instance this method could be used to determine the relative strengths of the 
objectives of combating terrorism, peace operations, counter-drug operations and 
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humanitarian assistance concerning International Peace operations as higher level 
objective. First, decision-makers have to identify the most and least important of the four 
lower-level objectives and have to give values 1 and 9 accordingly. Then they have to 
express how they evaluate the importance of combating terrorism compared to the other 
three objectives. Then they have to compare peace operations to counter-drug operations 
and humanitarian assistance. The last comparison would be of counter-drug operations 
and humanitarian assistance. When the matrix is ready, decision-makers could determine 
the eigenvector.20 The eigenvector will determine the priority between the different 
objectives. It is an important to determine the priority weights for these objectives, 
because this makes it possible to sum the relative importance of the different tasks and 
their elements in terms of the top goal of ensuring defense for the nation. 
At the lowest level, however, the full process of AHP could be applied to 
determine the best alternatives. The same process should be followed in order to 
determine the importance of the different tasks connected to a certain objective, for 
example peacekeeping. Figure 12 demonstrates the hierarchy used for peacekeeping. 
The different tasks of peacekeeping could be prioritized according to the value of the 
eigenvector. Afterwards, a matrix has to be made with the alternatives for each task. The 
alternatives could be the same that was used in case of peace enforcement operations, to 
participate in peacekeeping operation with a specialized and exclusive peacekeeping 
20 The eigenvector is determined by squaring the matrix and normalizing it until there is no change in the 
fourth decimal place between the eigenvectors. 
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force or to use conventional forces in this mission. By calculating the eigenvectors, the 
decision-makers can determine the relative strength of the alternatives in each objective. 
After all the eigenvectors are determined for the tasks, a matrix could be set up where the 
rows are the different alternatives and the columns represent different tasks. This matrix 
can be multiplied by the original eigenvector for the tasks and then the decision-maker 
can get the relative benefits for each alternative. 
Peacekeeping Supervising cease-fires 
1---------1 Movements observation 
Disarming military 
forces 
1---------1 Provide security to 
population 




Figure 12. The Hierarchy for Peacekeeping 
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convoys 
The process of creating the matrices for both the tasks and the alternatives is 
complex; therefore the pairwise comparison has to be implemented by a group of experts, 
representing the different stakeholders. These stakeholders represent different interest 
groups and have different point of views. 
Table 3 illustrates a matrix of pairwise comparison, used for evaluating the 
relationship among the tasks under peacekeeping. The modified version of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process seems to be a useful tool in the case, when numeric measurements for 
alternatives could not be directly applied because of the specifics of the tasks. 
Supervising Movements Disarming Providing Train de- Protecting 
cease-fires observation forces security mining humanitarian 
teams aid convoys 
Supervising 0.310 2.000 1.000 3.000 3~000 2.000 
cease-fires 
Movements 0.500 0.070 0.250 0.250 0.500 0.500 
observation 
Disarming 1.000 4.000 0.149 0.500 1.000 1.000 
forces 
Providing 0.333 4.000 2.000 0.195 2.000 1.000 
securitv 
Train 0.333 2.000 1.000 0.500 0.101 0.333 
de mining 
teams 
Protecting 0.500 2.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 0.174 
humanitarian 
. aid convoys 
Table 3. Pairwise Comparison Matrix Used for AHP for Peacekeeping Operations 
For example, in the first row, comparing task Supervising cease-fires to task 
Disarming forces has the same importance (1.000). In comparing task Movement 
observation to task Disarming forces, the sample matrix shows, that the latter has more 
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importance, on our measure between moderate and strong, than Movement observation 
(4.000 and 0.250). 
To measure the alternatives for each task, separate matrices are used, where the 
alternatives are compared in the same way for a task. By aggregating the weight between 
the alternatives and the weight among the tasks, the two alternatives can be compared at 
the level of peacekeeping operations. 
Alternative Utility 
General force 0 .514 
Specialized force 0.486 
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Figure 13. Ranking Alternatives for Pe~cekeeping Operations by Using AHP 
After obtaining the utilities for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it is 
important to see how the different approaches, the MAUF A and the AHP, could be used 
at the same time to evaluate alternatives at the higher level of peace operations. The 
model used AHP to measure the relation between the two objectives. Appendix A 
contains the weights used in the model for peace operations. After determining the 
relative importance of peace operations to peacekeeping (0.3333), the weight was used to 
determine an aggregated value for the alternatives at the level of peace operations. 
Figure 14 shows these values. 
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Alternative Utility 
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Figure 14. Value of Alternatives at the Level of Peace Operations 
As the figure shows, in our model the value of the alternatives in the level of 
peace operations becomes more balanced. The reason is twofold. First, the ranking of 
alternatives in the peace enforcement objective evaluation showed a moderately large 
advantage for using specialized forces (0.723 and 0.656 = 0.067); while in the 
peacekeeping this was (0.514 and 0.486 = 0.028) advantage for using general forces. 
While the weights between peacekeeping (0.3333) and peace enforcement. (0.6667) 
indicate that peace enforcement has more importance than peacekeeping. The smaller 
difference in the peacekeeping utility scores results a more balanced ranking. The same 
method could be used to determine the ranking of alternatives for higher level objectives. 
The model could compare peace operations or peace enforcement to other operations in 
the hierarchy of objectives up to the highest level of national objectives, by using AHP 
and following the procedure described above. Decision-makers only have to identify the 
level, where the alternatives are comparable. Because the model focused on peace 
oper~tions and used detailed information only in this area, it is not possible to show this 
comparison. However, when several levels of objectives and tasks are established for 
other branches of the hierarchy, the relevant comparison could be made. 
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D. CHAPTERSUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the two methods that could be used to define priorities, 
weights, for the different objectives and tasks of the hierarchy. The chapter gave a 
detailed overview of Multiattribute utility function analysis and its use to calculate 
utilities for the two alternatives and rank them in connection with the peace enforcement 
mission operations. The MAUF A was shown to be a useful tool for alternative 
evaluation in cases, when performance standards could be set up for objectives and tasks. 
In other situations, when such performance standards are difficult to establish, the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process turned out to be a helpful method. The chapter demonstrated 
the further use of AHP for comparison of alternatives when higher level objectives are 
taken into account. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSION 
Defense planning can make extensive use of a model directly connecting national 
security objectives to tasks of the armed forces. Among the different planning 
approaches, the Strategy-to-Task model may best clarify the hierarchy of objectives in 
defense planning. The hierarchy consists of several levels. National security objectives 
constitute the top level. One level below, national military objectives can be found, 
followed by missions. Objectives and tasks compose the next level, under missions. 
Performance standards constitute the lowest level of the hierarchy and measure the 
achievement of the tasks. Performance standards can· be used to develop the. utility 
function for a task. The hierarchy helps the decision-maker compare different tasks and 
objectives that otherwise would be difficult to measure. It also may improve resource 
allocation decisions by enabling decision-makers to compare the utilities of different 
alternatives and describe this comparison in different levels of the hierarchy. The process 
of building the Strategy-to-Task hierarchy enables decision-makers to receive a clear 
understanding of the relations among the objectives and to connect their decisions to 
these objectives. The model helps to understand how much influence the tasks of the 
armed forces have on achieving national military and national security objectives. 
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The thesis studied two analytic methods for the Strategy-to-Task method to 
establish utilities at each level of the hierarchy. 
Multiattribute Utility Function Analysis was shown to be a useful tool for 
alternative evaluation in cases, when performance standards can be developed for 
objectives and tasks. In contrast, the Analytic Hierarchy Process turned out to be a 
helpful method in situations, when such performance standards are more difficult to 
establish. The thesis discussed how AHP might be used to make comparisons of 
alternatives from the angle of higher level objectives. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The Strategy-to-Task planning approach is a useful tool for defense planning. 
The great benefit it provides for civilian and military decision-makers, through ensuring 
understanding of the hierarchy of defense related objectives and tasks, is that it leads to 
better decisions. The Strategy-to-Task model could serve as a useful substitute planning 
tool in countries where defense resources are planned but there is no clear linkage to 
national security objectives. In the first step a detailed hierarchy should be worked out by 
stakeholders, such elected politicians, high-ranking military leaders and representatives 
of several organizations of the defense sector. 
68 
The high-level national security objectives should be based the country's 
Constitution and on other legislation. The hierarchy should account for the entire defense 
establishment, in order to see all the relationships among the objectives and tasks. 
Senior policymakers should discuss the weights for at least the first two levels of 
the Strategy-to-Task hierarchy. These weights should be subject of review every year, 
and needed changes should be taken place. 
In the final step, an information technology management system should be set up 
according to the hierarchy, but should also permit the users to make modification in the 
structure if it becomes necessary. This system could be used for planning purposes and 
as a decision-support aid. 
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APPENDIX A. WEIGHTS USED IN THE MULTIA TTRIBUTE UTILITY 
FUNCTION 
This appendix contains information on the weights that were used for the 
Multiattribute utility function in the Logical Decisions for Windows software. The 
readeris referred to the Manual of Logical Decisions for Windows pp. 8-18 - 8-20 for a 
detailed discussion of the meaning of this type of information. 
Scaling Constants for the Preference Set. 
Peace operations Goal has K = 0, defined by Analytic Hierarchy Process and no 
interactions 
Peace enforcement Goal weight = 0.6667 
Peacekeeping Goal weight = 0.3333 
Combating terrorism Goal members are in International Peace Operations Goal MUF 
Counter-drug operations Goal members are in International Peace Operations Goal MUF 
Humanitarian assistance Goal members are in International Peace Operations Goal MUF 
Peace enforcement Goal has K = 0, defined by direct entry and no interactions 
Employ firepower Goal weight = 0.2056 
Perform logistics and combat support Goal weight = 0.2056 
Exercise command and control Goal weight = 0.2056 
Protect the force Goal weight = 0.2056 
Force deployment/conduct maneuver Goal weight= 0.1222 
Develop intelligence Goal weight = 0.0556 
Peacekeeping Goal has K = 0, defined by Analytic Hierarchy Process and no interactions 
Suprevising cease-fires Goal weight= 0.2851 
Providing security to population Goal weight= 0.1989 
Protecting humanitarian aid convoys Goal weight= 0.1746 
Disarming military forces Goal weight = 0.1708 
Training and leading de-mining teams Goal weight= 0.1023 
Movements observation Goal weight = 0.0682 
Pea~e making Goal members are in Peace operations Goal MUF 
Employ firepower Goal has K = 0, defined by Smarter method and no interactions 
Process targets Goal weight= 0.4167 
Employ air power Goal weight = 0.4167 
Control forces Goal weight= 0.1667 
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Perlorm logistics and combat support Goal has K = 0, defined by Smarter method and no 
interactions 
Equip the force Goal weight = 0.3167 
Provide personnel support Goal weight = 0.3167 
Conduct Resource management Goal weight= 0.1500 
Perlorm base support Goal weight = 0.1500 
Provide mission support Goal weight = 0.0667 
Exercise command and control Goal has K = 0, defined by Smarter method and no 
interactions 
Acquire and communicate information Goal weight = 0.5278 
Direct and lead subordinate forces Goal weight= 0.1944 
Assess situation Goal weight= 0.1944 . 
Determine actions Goal weight = 0.0833 
Protect the force Goal has K = 0, defined by Smarter method and no interactions 
Perlorm rescue Goal weight = 0.3333 
Provide force protection Goal weight = 0.3333 
Enhance survivability Goal weight = 0.3333 
Force deployment/conduct maneuver Goal has K = 0, defined by direct entry and no 
interactions 
Deploy forces Goal weight= 0.3750 
Position communication and navigation systems Goal weight= 0.3750 
Assess area of operations Goal weight= 0.1250 
Redeploy forces Goal weight = 0.1250 
Develop intelligence Goal has K = 0, defined by Smarter method and no interactions 
Collect information Goal weight = 0.3278 
Plan and direct tactical intelligence activities Goal weight= 0.2611 
Prepare intelligence reports Goal weight= 0.2611 
Process information Goal weight= 0.1500 
Suprevising cease-fires Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
Fighting Measure weight= 0.2851 
Providing security to population Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
Armed conflicts Measure weight= 0.1989 
Protecting humanitarian aid convoys Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
Unprotected convoys Measure weight= 0.1746 
Disarming military forces Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
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Disarmed forces Measure weight = 0.1708 
Training and leading de-mining teams Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
Trained teams Measure weight = 0.1023 
Movements observation Goal members are in Peacekeeping Goal MUF 
Observed movements Measure weight = 0.0682 
Process targets Goal members are in Employ firepower Goal MUF 
Targets processed Measure weight= 0.4167 
Employ air power Goal members are in Employ firepower Goal MUF 
Percent air power employed Measure weight= 0.4167 
Control forces Goal members are in Employ firepower Goal MUF 
Control level Measure weight = 0.1667 
Equip the force Goal members are in Perform logistics and combat support Goal MUF 
Force equipped Measure weight = 0.3167 
Provide personnel support Goal members are in Perform logistics and combat support 
GoalMUF 
Level of support provided Measure weight = 0.3167 
Conduct Resource management Goal members are in Perform logistics and combat 
support Goal MUF 
-Level of resource management Measure weight= 0.1500 
Perform base support Goal members are in Perform logistics and combat support Goal 
MUF 
Level of support provided2 Measure weight= 0.1500 
Provide mission support Goal members are in Perform logistics and combat support Goal 
MUF 
Level of support provided I Measure weight= 0.0667 
Acquire and communicate information Goal members are in Exercise command and 
control Goal MUF 
Communication errors Measure weight = 0.5278 
Direct and lead subordinate forces Goal members are in Exercise command and control 
GoalMUF 
Level of leadership Measure weight= 0.1944 
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Assess situation Goal members are in Exercise command and control Goal MUF 
Accuracy of assessment Measure weight= 0.1944 
Determine actions Goal members are in Exercise command and control Goal MUF 
Number of Alternatives Measure weight = 0.0833 
Perform rescue Goal members are in Protect the force Goal MUF 
Forced rescued Measure weight = 0.3333 
Provide force protection Goal members are in Protect the force Goal MUF 
Casualties Measure weight= 0.3333 
Enhance survivability Goal members are in Protect the force Goal MUF 
Survivability Measure weight= 0.3333 
Deploy forces Goal members are in Force deployment/conduct maneuver Goal MUF 
Percent of forces deployed Measure weight= 0.3750 
Position communication and navigation systems Goal members are in Force 
deployment/conduct maneuver Goal MUF 
System positioned Measure weight= 0.3750 
Assess area of operations Goal members are in Force deployment/conduct maneuver 
GoalMUF 
Area assessed Measure weight= 0.1250 
Redeploy forces Goal members are in Force deployment/conduct maneuver Goal MUF 
Forces redeployed Measure weight= 0.1250 
Collect information Goal members are in Develop intelligence Goal MUF 
Information level Measure weight= 0.2611 
Information collected vs. planned Measure weight = 0.0667 
Plan and direct tactical intelligence activities Goal members are in Develop intelligence 
GoalMUF 
Intel implemented vs. planned Measure weight= 0.2611 
Prepare intelligence reports Goal members are in Develop intelligence Goal MUF 
Number of reports prepared I Measure weight= 0.2611 
Process information Goal has K = 0, defined by Analytic Hierarchy Process and no 
interactions 
Information processed Measure weight= 0.7500 
Number of reports prepared Measure weight = 0.2500 
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APPENDIX B. MULTIA TTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTION ANALYSIS UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
In some cases, decision-makers are not able to identify the attribute values of an 
alternative as of certain, because there is a possibility of getting different outcomes 
depending on the situation. Multiattribute Utility Function Analysis can handle these 
cases of uncertainty. 
There are two conditions that the decision-maker's preferences must satisfy. 
First, the pair of attributes Xi and Xj is .preferentially independent of Xk meaning that 
conditional preferences in (xi and Xj) space given xk do not depend on the particular level 
of xk. Second, Xi is utility independent of Xj, meaning that conditional preferences for 
lotteries on Xi given Xj do not depend on the particular level of Xj- Utility independence is 
important, because each component utility function can be scaled one-dimensionally. 
The key theorem states that if for some Xi, the trade-offs between Xi and Xj are 
independent of the other variables (for all j~); and if for that Xi utility independence 
holds, then U(x) is either additive or multiplicative. The theorem assumes at least three 
attributes. 
The additive form is the following: 
U(x) = kiu1(x1) + kzu2(x2) + k3u3(x3), where l:ki=l 
Appendix C provides more details about the multiplicative form. 
Under uncertainty, decision-makers assign different probabilities for alternatives. 
For setting up a multi.attribute utility function for a given case, decision-makers have to 
determine the probability level p at which they are indifferent between, say, an alternative 
for sure and a lottery of two alternatives with probabilities p and (1-p ). 
Then depending on the value of l:ki in the general formula, the multiplicative (if 
l:kf;el) or the additive (if l:ki=l) formula could be used. By knowing the probabilities of 
the alternatives, the. decision-maker can determine the values of ki. 
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A more detailed description of using multiattribute utility function analysis under 
uncertainty is provided in Raiffa and Keeney. 
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APPENDIX C. MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTION ANALYSIS WITH 
INTERDEPENDENT ATTRIBUTES 
This appendix contains the formulas the LDW uses for interdependent attributes 
in the Multiattribute utility function analysis. 
Logical Decisions for Windows uses two formulas for MUFs. It uses the additive 
formula when there are no interactions between the goal's active members. The second 
MUF formula is the multiplicative formula. LDW uses it when there are interactions 
between the goal's active members. The multiplicative MUF formula requires an 
additional scaling constant called Big K. The· value of Big K indicates the degree of 
interactions between the goal's active members. The multiplicative MUF formula can be , 
written as follows: 
Ug(X) = ((l+Kk1Ul(xl))*(l+Kk2U2(x2))* ... *(l+KknUn(xn))- 1)/K 
where U(X) =the Utility of Alternative X for Goal g, 
K = the constant Big K for g, 
ki = the constant Small k for Member i of g, and 
Ui(xi) = the utility of alternative X for member i 
The multiplicative MUF formula has three interesting limits -- If Big K equals 
0.0, we get the additive formula. If Big K equals -1.0, we get Ug(X) = (1 - Ul(xl))*(l -
U2(x2))* ... *(l - Un(xn)) + 1, which equals 1.0 if Ui(xi) = 1.0 for any i. As Big K gets 
very large, we get Ug(X) = Ul(xl)*U2(x2)* ... *Un(xn), which equals 0.0 if Ui(xi) equals 
0.0 for any i. Intermediate values of Big K have intermediate degrees of interaction. Big 
Ks less than 0.0 mean that a high utility on an individual member can result in a high goal 
utility (constructive interaction), while Big K greater than 0.0 indicates that a low utility 
on an individual member can result in a lpw goal utility (destructive interaction). 
In the peace enforcement mission example, Develop intelligence Goal has four 
objectives: Plan and direct tactical intelligence activities, Collect information, Process 
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information and Prepare intelligence reports. There is interaction among these 
objectives. The information collected influences the outcome of the information process 
and the latter two influence the prepared intelligence reports. In this case the 
multiplicative formula could be used to determine the multiattribute utility function. 
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APPENDIX D. APPLYING AHP FOR A CAR PURCHASING PROBLEM 
This appendix contains an example for applying AHP in a car purchasing 
problem. 
For this decision to buy a new car, the objective of purchasing a car is placed at 
the top of the hierarchy. Attributes of the car that influence the decision, such as 
dependability, comfort and cost, are placed in the next level of the hierarchy, and the 
various car alternatives, such as BMW, Toyota and Pontiac, are listed at the lowest level. 
In the second step, pairwise comparisons are made about the factors of one level that 
contribute to achieving the objective of the next higher level, using the following 
pairwise comparison scale. 
Importance Defmition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Equal contribution to the objective 
3 Moderate importance of one over the other Slightly favoring one element over the 
other 
5 Essential or strong importance Strongly favoring one element over the 
other 
7 Very strong importance One element is strongly favored and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Extreme importance The favoring of one element over the 
' other is the highest possible 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values Compromise between two judgments 
Reciprocals When attribute i compared to j one of the above numbers is assigned, when attribute j is 
compared to i, reciprocals are assigned 
Ratios Ratios coming from forcing consistency of judgements 
The next step is to construct a comparison matrix including all alternatives and 
comparing them in connection with a given attribute. The following table shows such an 




















Similar matrix could be used for the other two attributes, comparing the 
alternatives and showing them in connection with cost and comfort. 
In the third step, the relative weight of each element in a level is computed using 
the eigenvalue21 solution technique. These weights are obtained by normalizing the 
pairwise comparison matrices, summing over the rows and getting an average row sum. 
These sums are the values of the priority vector, the eigenvector. The priority vector of 
dependability of the car purchasing example is [0.143, 0.286, 0.571], where the values 
are obtained by dividing the sum of each row by sum of the elements of the whole matrix 
(0.143=1.75/12.25). 
The fourth step aggregates the relative weights of the various levels from the 
previous step to construct a vector of composite weights. This vector actually is the 
weighted rankings of the alternatives with respect to the attribute being analyzed. This 
step starts with the top of the hierarchy determining the weights at this level that then are 
multiplied by the eigenvectors at the next lower level. The next table contains the 
calculation of the weights for level 2. This procedure is repeated at the lower levels and 
resulting in relative weights of the elements at the lowest level of the hierarchy. 
21 Readers are referred to the following web site for more information on eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues: http://www.cs.ut.ee/-toomas l/linalg/lin 1/node16.html#eigenvalue 
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix on Level 2 
Cost Comfort Dependability Sum Weight 
Cost 1 5 2 8 0.570 
Comfort 0.2 1 3 4.2 0.299 
Dependability 0.5 0.33 1.00 1.83 0.131 
Total: 14.03 
The figure shows that by summing the rows of the matrix (8, 4.2, 1.83) and 
counting their ratio to the sum of the whole matrix (14.03), the following weights are 
obtained for cost, comfort and dependability: (0.570, 0.299, 0.131) 
Assuming that the eigenvalues are the following for the second and third levels, 
based on the tables above, the composite priority of the cars would be: BMW=0.307, 
Toyota=0.295 and Pontiac=0.398. 
Level 2 ei envalues Cost Comfort 
0.570 0.299 0,131 
Level 3 ei envalues 
Attributes BMW To ota Pontiac 
Cost 0.400 0.400 0.200 
Comfort 0.200 0.100 0.700 
0.143 0.286 0.571 
(0.570)(0.4)+(0.299)(0.2)+ (0.131)(0.143) = 0.307 
(0.570)(0.4)+(0.299)(0.1)+ (0.131)(0.286) = 0.295 
(0.570)(0.2)+(0.299)(0.7)+ (0.131)(0.571) = 0.398 
As the table shows that the Pontiac should be purchased based on the buyer's 
preferences regarding cost, comfort and dependability. 
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